It is Afghanistan

What if Pakistan could vote in the US election? According to a new opinion poll, in a fortnight we’d all be listening to a speech by President Mitt Romney, not President Barack Obama if Pakistan had its way. Of course, all the other 20 countries polled said they would prefer to see Obama win the 2012 ticket.

Why was Pakistan the only country where the current president was not seen as the favoured candidate?
One explanation may be Romney’s recent comments highlighting the obvious importance of Pakistan, which has many people thinking that a Republican may indeed be more favourably inclined toward Pakistan. Plus the Osama raid and the ever-expanding drones programme in Pakistan haven’t really left too many Pakistanis enamoured of Obama. Time for someone new; they’re thinking. The administration we know has let us down.
But shouldn’t Pakistanis be worried that the Bushies are back and this time around, they’re playing for Team Romney?
Romney may be accused by some of being a moderate and a pragmatist but at least 17 of his 24 special advisers on foreign policy have served in the Bush administration. With this decidedly neoconservative crowd potentially making America’s Pakistan policy, should Pakistan be optimistic? Do we really want to put our fate in the hands of folks like John Bolton, Bush’s ambassador to the United Nations, whose neoconservative philosophy is seen to be fundamentally responsible for getting the US into Iraq and who has long advocated bombing Iran?
The idea of Bolton and other Bush-Cheney officials being in charge is a creepy one for most Pakistanis, some would argue.
But does it really matter? Will a Romney or an Obama win really make a difference to US policy towards Pakistan?
Ask most informed sources in DC and they either give you an emphatic ‘no,’ or an indifferent ‘don’t think so.’
It is not as though Romney will put an end to the use of drones or reverse the decision to pull out of Afghanistan. Sure, he’s been going around accusing the Obama administration of being at fault for souring the relationship with Pakistan, but few can put their finger on what he’s actually talking about. “I think no one really knows what Romney’s views on Pakistan, and foreign policy in general, are. He’s taken just about every position under the sun so it isn’t clear what he would do differently, if elected,” argued an American journalist based in Kabul.
But even more importantly, the question of who occupies the Oval Office is irrelevant for Pakistan in so far as US policy towards it transcends personalities and partisan politics and is linked, broadly, to three main concerns: terrorism, nuclear issues and the wrapping up of the Afghan war. In this sense, America’s future policy will predominantly depend on Pakistan’s own performance against militancy domestically and in the neighbourhood. In fact, as the new guy, Romney may even need to prove that he’s tougher than Obama and thus subject Pakistan to greater pressure, especially on terrorism.
The more likely scenario, however, is that on the hard, non-negotiable issues, there is little chance Pakistan will get special consideration simply because of a change of guard in Washington. Nevertheless, that also does not mean that the ‘isolate Pakistan’ camp, comprising many in the CIA and the defence establishment, will win. Sure, there are serious foreign policy thinkers and military commanders that want to openly break with Pakistan, cut off all money and label it a supporter of terrorism. But will this happen?
The answer lies not in who will sit in the Oval Office but how Pakistan itself will act in the days to come.
An informed US source who has briefed both Obama and Romney explained: “Neither [Obama nor Romney] wants to pick a fight with Pakistan, but neither now trusts it, in particular the US military that feels that it has been betrayed [in Afghanistan].”
Indeed, most republicans and democrats on the administration side are in agreement that the US cannot cut Pakistan loose. But this insistence on remaining engaged must not be conflated with a willingness to accommodate Pakistan come what may. It also must not be confused with the US letting Pakistan do as it pleases. In the pivotal 2013-2014 phase in which the US will inevitably view Pakistan through the lens of the Afghan withdrawal, Pakistan has to reciprocate the Unites States’ “hope for the best” sentiment in real and meaningful terms and strive to stay on the right side of international opinion. Keeping the relationship with the US and Afghanistan going is the way to go, rather than falling prey to the hawks and hardliners in the civilian and security establishment who, despite all evidence to the contrary, still think they have all the answers.
As crooked as the Afghan conundrum may be, the only way out for Pakistan is to walk the straight and narrow. That is, to straighten out and clarify its own Afghan policy and break its habit of being reactive to the policies of other countries. And to stop manipulating the Afghan peace process purely from the lens of its own national interest and clarify, internally, what role its security establishment is able and willing to play in the Afghan resettlement. Committing too much and then failing to deliver as well as continuing to insist on a role without enunciating the specific support Pakistan can offer, will only push outside actors, including the US and India, to seek a course less reliant on Pakistan.
And while the US may continue to attach importance to Pakistan regardless of who runs the White House, Pakistan will need to stop trying to translate this importance into more aid. “Normal cooperative relations with the US are vital but at present aid has distorted public discourse and perceptions in both countries and negatively impacted on bilateral relations,” a former foreign secretary explained.
Most importantly, Pakistan has to stop pursuing its interests in Afghanistan only through connections with the Taliban and enlarge the framework of the bilateral relationship to include trade, energy, reconstruction projects and joint investments. Publicly, the foreign office says it is talking to non-Pakhtuns now but privately officials will still insist that sidelining Pakhtuns will lead to devastating consequences for Afghanistan. This in simplespeak means: Pakistan won’t accept a non-Pakhtun dominated dispensation, no matter what.
This thinking is no longer sustainable. Pakistan has to be imaginative when it comes to Afghanistan and pursue a policy that focuses both on stabilising Afghanistan and normalising bilateral relations. Keeping channels open with Kabul and helping the process of reconciliation by discouraging the Taliban from violence will be key. Troublemaking activities, on the other hand, will only be a recipe for continuing turmoil and further complications. For instance, what happens in the event of a triggering explosion or a severe terrorist attack in the US or on US interests in Afghanistan? That could be a game-changer, giving the United States, and even India, more freedom to do what they want with Pakistan. Another key in terms of future policy, according to policy makers in DC, is if the Quetta Shura stays or goes. The hardliners in the security establishment here have to get this. There’s no two ways about it.
“Pakistanis will have to deal with the chaos and the suicide bombings post-2014, if they don’t get their act together,” is how one US opinion maker put it. “Not Americans. The Pakistanis will reap what they sow.”
The writer is an Islamabad-based journalist. Email: mehreenzahramalik@gmail.com; Twitter: @mehreenzahra